

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
NEW WAR DEPARTMENT BUILDING
21st and VIRGINIA AVENUE, N. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

7 May 1946

PLANNING DIRECTIVE NO. 17a

SUBJECT: C.I.G. Policy on Security Clearance of Personnel

1. Departmental comments regarding CIG 7 have been received as follows:

- a. Enclosure A from CNI.
- b. Enclosure B from SA-L.
- c. Enclosure C from Director of FBI.

A copy of each of these comments is enclosed for file in the Security Branch.

2. Comments and recommendations of the Security Branch are desired.

FOR THE ACTING CHIEF, CENTRAL PLANNING STAFF:

25X1A9a



Acting Deputy Chief, Central Planning Staff

3 Encls: As listed in 1 a, b and c

DISTRIBUTION:

Security Branch (Original)
Control File (Planning Directive No. 17)
Subject file - Security Measures for CIG
Suspense File - 13 May

DOC	01	REV DATE	21/4/46	BY	506149
ORIG COMP	10	OPI	31	TYPE	02
ORIG CLASS	C	REV CLASS	4	AUTH	HR 70-2
JUST		NEXT REV			

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78-4007
232216

3 May 1946

Subject: C.I.G. 7

1. The subject paper is
c. Disapproved. Request meeting of
I.A.B. to consider paper.
2. Suggestions or amendments:

Proposed amendments:

Page 3, paragraph 7, line 2 of the enclosure -
after "by" insert "a screening committee consist-
ing of one representative each of the State De-
partment, Military Intelligence Division (G-2),
Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) and the office
of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff-2 (A-2), and
then by". After "C.I.G.," change comma to a
period; delete "and" and capitalize "final".

(Signed) CHAS. J. REND
for
THOS. B. INGLIS
Chief of Naval Intelligence

C.I.G. 7:

1. The subject paper is

b. Approved, subject to the minor
amendments set out below

X

"Paragraph 13 to read: Any exceptions to the foregoing provisions shall require the unanimous concurrence of the Director of Central Intelligence and all Departments of the Department nominating the personnel for duty with the Central Intelligence Group. Such concurrence will be obtained through the respective Security Liaison Officers of the Central Intelligence Group and the agencies agency concerned.

"The amendment recommended in paragraph 1 is necessary to enable competent, highly qualified and experienced personnel of the Department of State to serve on assignment to the Central Intelligence Group and does not exclude such personnel because they happened to have been born abroad of American parents, or of foreign parents (including citizens of such countries as Canada or Great Britain) and came to the United States as children. It is believed that an arbitrary exclusion of such persons is unrealistic and undesirable. The amendment recommended provides a workable device for clearance of such personnel.

"WILLIAM L. LANGER (Signed)

"Special Assistant to the Secretary

"May 1, 1946"

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
United States Department of Justice
Washington 25, D.C.

April 29, 1946

PERSONAL AND ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

Rear Admiral Sidney W. Souers
Director
Central Intelligence Group
Room 4253
New War Department Building
21st and Virginia Avenue
Washington, D. C.

Dear Admiral Souers:

I have reviewed the draft of a proposed CIC directive concerning "policy on clearance of personnel for duties with Central Intelligence Group", enclosed with your letter of April 25, 1946.

The minimum investigation of CIC personnel as set forth in the directive would appear to be satisfactory from the standpoint of determination of an individual's qualifications in the light of the personnel standards from the security standpoint set up in the directive. I would like to suggest that the provision that a minimum of 10 years honorable government service where there is no subsequent information creating a suspicion of disloyalty or question as to discretion may constitute the basis for clearance of an individual for duties with the Central Intelligence Group may make possible the entry of unsatisfactory persons into the employment of the Central Intelligence Group.

It is believed that there are many persons in government employment for a period of ten years or more and who have what appears to be unblemished records insofar as integrity and loyalty is concerned who do not make satisfactory employees for the Central Intelligence Group from the security standpoint. I would like to suggest that consideration be given to eliminating this provision and that an investigation be required of all persons, or that they must have undergone a satisfactory previous security investigation.

Sincerely yours,

J. EDGAR HOOVER (Signed)